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PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN NEBRASKA:
THE NEED FOR A LONG ARM STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Gaining personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is a
problem frequently encountered by Nebraska attorneys. When
faced with this problem, present Nebraska law requires that the
attorney pursue one of two courses of action: (1) wait until the
defendant is physically present within the state and serve him
with process at that time, or (2) show that the defendant has in
some way impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of Nebraska
courts.'
Over twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington2 abandoned "presence" and
"implied consent" as a standard for jurisdiction, and substituted a
test based upon "minimum contacts" and "substantial justice. ' 3
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black, has since
justified this change by arguing that jurisdictional tests based
1 While these alternatives are, as a general rule, the only ones from
which a Nebraska attorney has to choose, for a more detailed picture
of present Nebraska law see notes 105-125 infra and accompanying
text.
2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 For the United States Supreme Court's statement of the law before
International Shoe see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). That
case emphasized the importance of geographic limitations upon the
states' power to exert jurisdiction over a nonresident. It said that in
personam jurisdiction could only be obtained if the nonresident
voluntarily appeared, or was served process within the state. These
territorial limitations produced theories for gaining jurisdiction based
upon "presence" and "implied consent." If a corporation was "doing
business" in the forum it was considered to be present there for pur-
poses of service of process. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S.
530 (1907). And an individual was held to have impliedly consented
to jurisdiction if he had an automobile accident on the state's high-
ways. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
For a general discussion of the International Shoe doctrine and
its effect on prior law see Campbell, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Individuals and Foreign Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 36 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-
Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKy MT. L. Rav. 285 (1958); Foster, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv.
522; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, from Pennoyer to Denckla:
A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State
Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CoRNaLL L.Q.
196 (1957); Transient Jurisdiction-Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff-A
Round Table, 9 J. PUB. L. 281 (1960).
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upon geographical limitations are no longer consistent with the
demands of a modern society, where transportation and communi-
cations make travel and contacts between the states an everyday
occurrence.
4
In response to International Shoe, several state legislatures
have codified jurisdictional due process as outlined in that case.5
These statutes allow the state's judicial machinery to reach be-
yond state boundaries and pull in nonresident defendants. It is
this characterization of the statute from which the term "long arm
statute" is derived. Nebraska is one of those states which has not
taken advantage of this new type of legislation.
The principle advantages which would inure to Nebraska
should it enact a long arm statute, are threefold: (1) It would
increase the opportunity for extraterritorial service and, conse-
quently, benefit those employing its use by providing them with
the money-saving advantage and convenience of litigating in their
home forum; (2) Nebraska courts would be given a greater op-
portunity to enforce its laws and protect its citizens instead of
entrusting this duty to the judicial system of foreign states; and
(3) legal fees derived from causes of action arising in Nebraska
would be secured for Nebraska attorneys who are better versed
in local law.
Under present Nebraska law these advantages are not avail-
able. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to create an incen-
tive for the passage of a long arm statute in Nebraska, and to
provide information which will be helpful in drafting and inter-
preting its provisions.
II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DUE PROCESS
There are three major decisions of the United States Supreme
Court outlining the basic requirements and limitations imposed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment upon the
states' power to exert personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants.
In the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington6 the Court departed from the traditional notion that juris-
diction is based upon a state's physical power over persons ap-
4 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
5 See notes 18-25 infra and accompanying text.
6 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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pearing within its bordersJ and suggested that the true test de-
pended upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in
the forum. 8 Consequently, jurisdiction did not require his pres-
ence within the forum, but rather that he have "certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.'0 followed, giving impetus
to International Shoe by upholding jurisdiction on the basis of one
isolated contact with the forum. The defendant, a Texas insur-
ance company, solicited a reinsurance agreement from a California
resident. The insured accepted the offer in California and mailed
the premiums from there to the Texas company until his death.
In allowing California jurisdiction over the Texas company the
Court stated that "consent," "doing business," and "presence"
were no longer proper standards for measuring the extent to
which a state could exert its judicial power over a foreign defend-
ant. Instead it emphasized California's interest in providing
proper redress for its citizens against foreign insurers who are
reluctant to pay claims."
Finally, in Hanson v. Denckla 2 the Supreme Court demon-
strated that due process still required some limitations to be
placed upon the state's jurisdictional powers. In that case a trust
agreement was executed with a Delaware firm by a resident of
Pennsylvania. Subsequently, the settlor moved to Florida. In
the litigation which followed, Florida tried to exercise jurisdiction
over the Delaware corporation, but the Court held that there were
7 Justice Holmes expressed this when he recognized that "[t]he founda-
tion of jurisdiction is physical power ... " McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
8 The major activities of the corporation within the state included the
solicitation of business by their salesmen who had no authority to
conclude a contract in the state, and the displaying of samples in
rooms rented by the corporation.
9 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
10 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
11 It has been argued that McGee is limited to situations in which the
state has a special regulatory interest such as insurance, securities,
and highways. See, e.g., Trippe lfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959); Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416(D. Minn. 1959). Professor Currie answers the argument in this way:
"I cannot see why a State is any less strongly concerned to ensure
that its injured residents recover compensation from those who injure
them than from those who promise to pay for injuries caused by
others." Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in lrlinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 549.
12 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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still some territorial limitations over the powers of the respective
states, and that the "unilateral" activity of the settlor in moving
to Florida could not satisfy the contact requirements necessary
for jurisdiction under due process. The Court said that "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws."'1 Since it was the settlor who moved to Florida
on her own initiative it cannot be said that the defendant pur-
posefully availed itself of the protection of Florida law.
These recent decisions have caused traditional tests for juris-
diction to evolve into a determination of what is fair in each situa-
tion.14 The outcome of each case, therefore, depends upon its own
facts15 and requires a balancing of the interests involved. 16 Some
of the more important interests which must be considered are:
(1) the trial convenience of the forum; (2) the interests of the
state in enforcing its own laws and protecting its citizens; (3) the
inconvenience resulting to the defendant if he must travel a great
distance to defend; and (4) the expense to the plaintiff if he must
travel to a distant forum to enforce his claim.1
III. LEGISLATIVE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SHOE
A. TYPES OF LONG ARii STATUTES AVAILABLE IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS.
The grandfather of all present-day long arm statutes was en-
acted in 1955 by the Illinois legislature. 18 Its provisions were
based upon the International Shoe doctrine and, therefore, drafted
for the specific purpose of extending jurisdiction over nonresidents
to the limits of due process.19 The text of the statute provides:
13 Id. at 253.
14 See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv.
L. REV. 909, 923-25 (1960).
15 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
16 Supra note 14.
17 An evaluation of these interests has become a part of the due process
test. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24
(1957). It is interesting to note that this aspect of due process is very
similar to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956). For a discussion of this statute
see Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 599 (1955).
19 ILL. RBv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956), Historical and Practice Notes p.
165. It was there stated that: 'With the adoption of this section, flli-
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(1) Any person,20 whether or not a citizen or resident of this
State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate sit-
uated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk lo-
cated within this State at the time of contracting.
Several states have since enacted similar statutes, 21 New York
having recently enacted one nearly identical to that of Illinois.
22
The statute most general in terminology, and therefore the
vaguest, is Rhode Island's. 23  It merely states that the courts of
that state shall exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents to the ex-
tent allowable under due process.
The Wisconsin statute,24 enacted in 1959, was obviously drafted
with an attempt toward eliminating the vagueness of the due
process concept. It too reaches for the limits of due process, as
do all long arm statutes, but is much more definite in illustrating
the situations in which a nonresident will be expected to defend
in its courts.
Finally, in 1962 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
made their contribution to the growing interests in extended juris-
diction by submitting their own act for consideration. 25 Its provi-
sions were more detailed than the Illinois law, but still did not
approach the exactness of the Wisconsin statute.
nois has expanded the in personam jurisdiction of its courts to the
limits permitted under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
20 The words "Any person" emphasize an important aspect of a long arm
statute. It applies equally to individuals and corporations alike.
21 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 112, § 21 (Supp. 1963); MONT. R. Civ. P., Rule 4B; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3-16 (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1962).
22 N.Y. Civ. PaAc. § 302.
23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1965). See also N.J. RULES
4:4-4(d).
24 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1965). The Wisconsin Statute is com-
prised of twelve major provisions at least one of which is more exten-
sive in itself than the major provisions of the Illinois Act in toto.
25 UNiFoRmW LAWS ANN. 9B MIsc. ACTS § 1.03 (Supp. 1964).
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B. THEORY BEHIND TmE DRAFTING AND INTERPRETING OF A LONG ARm
STATUTE.
All true long arm statutes are drafted with the intent of ex-
pressing, as nearly as possible, a statutory formulation of juris-
dictional due process as it appears in International Shoe.26 The
difficulty which the drafter faces is how to define, with particu-
larity, a concept based upon "minimum contacts" and "substantial
justice." These two elements by nature require a factual deter-
mination. Consequently the drafter must try to overcome the
problem of how to be accurate in drawing the provisions of the
statute, and yet keep them flexible enough so that the court can
honestly interpret them to conform with the limits of due process.
A misstatement of the law could very easily cause the provisions
to go beyond or fall short of this goal.
There seems to be only three major solutions to this problem.
The first is simply alertness in interpretation. This requires an
understanding of the statute's purpose to reach the limits of due
process, and then a reading of it to conform to this purpose.
Secondly, the statute can be drafted in language general and
vague enough so as to encompass all factual situations constitu-
tionally possible.27 This solution does, however, sacrifice one of
the major virtues of good draftsmanship in that it will not serve
as adequate notice to those who may be affected by the statute.
Finally, a provision could be added which would explain the
purpose of the statute and require that the words employed in its
provisions should be construed liberally, but only in a manner
which would allow for jurisdiction in all situations consistent with
due process.28 The drafter would'therefore be able to illustrate
the situations in which jurisdiction would probably lie without
having to worry about frustrating the purpose of the statute.
This latter method seems preferable since it insures a proper in-
terpretation of the statute without sacrificing the important ele-
ment of notice.
26 See note 19 supra. See also Briggs, Contemporary Problems in Con-
flict of Laws: Jurisdiction by Statute Part II, 24 MONT. L. REV. 85
(1963).
27 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1965); N.J. RULES
4:4-4(d).
28 Wisconsin has included a special provision within its code requiring
that the statute be construed liberally so as to effectuate its purpose.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.01 (Supp. 1965).
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C. MAJOR PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE DRAFTING AND INTERPRETING OF
A LONG Aim STATUTE.
As was previously mentioned, giving proper notice is an im-
portant aspect of drafting a statute. Wisconsin's long arm statute
presents a good model. Its detailed provisions completely outline
the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction and, in this way, warn
the average businessman of the circumstances which will give rise
to his liability to defend in that state.
Where the Illinois act merely refers to a "tortious act" com-
mitted within the state, the Wisconsin statute provides the fol-
lowing:
(3) Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to per-
son or property within or without this state arising out of an act
or omission within this state by the defendant.
(4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to
person or property within this state arising out of an act or omis-
sion outside this state by the defendant, provided in addition that
at the time of the injury either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within
this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or man-
ufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within this
state in the ordinary course of trade.29
In a long arm statute detailed notice can give rise to a problem.
By committing the statute to precise definition, the legislature
may include some cases that, while falling within the strict word-
ing of the statute, still offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.30 Jurisdiction in such cases would be denied
on the grounds of due process. Precise definition may also exclude
cases where jurisdiction could constitutionally be applied. In
this respect the statute may "inhibit the flexibility of courts in
dealing with [these] unforseen situations."$'
29 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 262.05(3), (4) (Supp. 1965).
30 For a case denying jurisdiction on constitutional grounds which seems
to fall within section (4) (b) of the Wisconsin act see O'Brien v.
Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963). Also, for
what would seem to be a clear case for jurisdiction under (5) (e) see
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956). That case denied jurisdiction on a constitutional basis. Only
one shipment of goods had been made into the state and that was
solicited by the buyers agent during a business trip to the seller's forum.
On this point Professor Currie stated that "it is arguable that it so
affects the equities as to require the buyer to return also when he is
plaintiff." Currie, The Growth of The Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 556.
31 Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L. REv.
909, 1017 (1960).
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In addition to solutions previously suggested in connection
with this problem, 2 the court may also rely upon the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to exclude from the purview of the statute
cases which cannot conveniently be tried in that forum.
3 3
The Illinois act also illustrates the difficulty in drafting a
long arm statute. Its provision relating to "[the commission of a
tortious act within this State"34 has given rise to several problems
in interpretation.
A literal reading of the provision suggests that jurisdiction can
only be asserted over a nonresident if his "acts" are committed
within the state. This would greatly restrict the statute's power
to reach the limits of due process. Realizing this, the Illinois
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "tortious act" liberally to
mean tort which in choice of law embodies consideration of not
only where the act occurred but where the injury resulted.35 In
this manner suit was allowed when the injury had taken place
within the state.36
Montana solved this problem with a simple change of word-
ing. The applicable provision reads: "the commission of any act
which results in accrual within this state of a tort action."3 7 The
word "accrual" obviously has made it immaterial where the de-
fendant's acts were committed.
The second problem which arises from this same provision
is whether actual proof must be shown that a tort was committed
within the state before jurisdiction can be asserted. If this were
true a plaintiff, who obtains jurisdiction in Illinois under the "tor-
tious act" clause and gets a default judgment, may be forced to
prove the merits (tortious act) when he attempts to enforce the
default judgment in another state and it is there collaterally
attacked on the basis that the Illinois act did not apply.
This problem was also sidestepped by the Illinois Supreme
Court in holding that the clause only required that the plaintiff
state a cause of action in tort arising from the conduct of the
defendant. 8
8
32 See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
33 A section of the Wisconsin Code specifically allows this. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 262.19 (Supp. 1965).
84 ILL. RsFv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)b (1963).
35 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961).
86 Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
37 MoNT. R. Civ. P., Rule 4(B)1(b).
88 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 393, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957).
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In comparing the Illinois and Wisconsin acts one will discover
that the draftsman is going to be presented with another prob-
lem. Specifically, should the act allow jurisdiction on the basis of
activities by the defendant within the state unrelated to the claim
sued upon? The Illinois statute apparently does not,39 whereas,
the Wisconsin statute specifically allows for jurisdiction on that
basis as long as the activities engaged in are "substantial and not
isolated. '40
The United States Supreme Court has upheld jurisdiction
based upon substantial activities totally unrelated to the cause of
action.41 It therefore appears that Illinois has excluded from its
statute certain cases where it would be constitutionally permis-
sable to assert jurisdiction.
This exclusion may come, however, as a matter of policy. By
excluding causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts
with the forum, the state might avoid opening its courts to cases
which could be more conveniently tried in some other forum. By
using the doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, the same
result would be accomplished. Nevertheless, the wording of the
Wisconsin statute seems to be more consistent with the initial pur-
pose of a long arm statute, that is, to assert jurisdiction to the
fullest extent allowable under the Constitution.
One final area included within the scope of the Wisconsin
statute that is excluded from the Illinois statute is causes of action
arising out of possession or ownership of personal property within
the state.42 This, however, may be a tenuous basis for asserting
jurisdiction since personal property is more readily moveable from
one forum to another thus lessening the state's interest in its well
being.43 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have ex-
pressly excluded this area from their law "because of the difficul-
39 Supra note 34. See also Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 253 N.Y.S.2d
215 (1964). That case holds that the New York long arm statute does
not allow for jurisdiction based upon contacts unrelated to the action,
but that section 301 of the New York Code does. This section reads:
"A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or
status as might have been exercised heretofore." It is possible that
this same result may be reached under section 17(4) of the Illinois
act depending upon the statutory or common law presently in effect
in that state.
40 The Wisconsin statute has a special provision allowing jurisdiction for
unrelated causes of action as long as there are other contacts with the
state. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (1)d (Supp. 1965).
41 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
42 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (6) (Supp. 1965).
43 Currie, supra note 30, at 580.
LEGISLATION-JURISDICTION
ties that might be posed in situations such as those involving sto-
len property, conditional sales and chattel mortgages."
44
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
In order that some advantages and possible difficulties arising
under a long arm statute might be illustrated, specific cases are
discussed below in sections corresponding to the provisions of the
Illinois act.
A. TRANSACTION OF BusNEss
Cases arising under the transaction of business clause have
generally been subjected to more rigid requirements for sustaining
jurisdiction than those arising under the tortious act clause.45
One reason may be that the courts continue to associate an action
related to business transactions with the old doing business test.
Generally, however, it may be said that under a long arm statute
the contacts necessary to sustain jurisdiction are considerably less
than those required under a doing business statute.46 An isolated
transaction may be enough to meet the requirements of a long
arm statute,47 whereas otherwise an accompanying intention to
continue transactions in the state might be necessary under doing
business.48
The main issue under transaction of business is whether or not
the minimum contact required for jurisdiction is a physical pres-
ence of the defendant or his agents within the state. McGee and
Hanson are largely responsible for this divergence of opinion.
The former emphasizes the state's interest in the controversy,
while the latter emphasizes the necessity for certain contacts with
the forum state. Hanson has therefore been interpreted by some
to require a physical presence within the state.
This approach was taken in Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co.
4 9
44 Supra note 25, commissioners' note 77.
45 See generally, Currie, supra note 30, at 538-79.
46 See Hass v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. IlM. 1957);
Steele v. De Leeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Lurie v. Rupe, 51 IM. App. 2d 164, 201 N.E.2d 158 (1964), cert. denied
380 U.S. 964 (1965).
47 See, e.g., Natural Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472
(7th Cir. 1959); Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245
N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Compania de Astral, S. A. v. Boston
Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954).
48 Tomson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 88 Neb. 399, 129 N.W.
529 (1911), rev'd on other grounds, 89 Neb. 791, 132 N.W. 405 (1911).
49 16 IIl. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
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which arose under the Illinois long arm statute. In that case the
plaintiffs had concluded a contract by mail with defendants, a
New York corporation, which granted the plaintiffs an exclusive
dealership of defendant's products in Chicago. Plaintiffs contin-
ued to act under this agreement for a considerable time until the
contract was allegedly breached by defendants. The court held
that Illinois could not constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation, emphasizing that plaintiffs were not agents of
the defendants while acting under the exclusive dealership in
Chicago. A later Illinois case interpreted Grobark as meaning that
the defendant or his agents must perform some acts related to the
claim sued upon while physically present within the state in order
to establish jurisdiction.50
Following Grobark, "transaction of business" generally was
interpreted to require some physical contact by the defendant or
his agent with the forum.51 This contact could occur in the form
of preliminary negotiations52 or the actual execution of a con-
tract,53 but the contact is not sufficient if the defendant's presence
within the forum was casual and the transaction of business was
more by accident than design.54 In the latter situation, where de-
fendant's presence was only casual, the court probably denied
jurisdiction because it would be unfair to the defendant to require
him to defend in that forum when his presence there was not
initially intended for business purposes.5 5 Likewise, when a
plaintiff solicits defendant's business and the defendant later
sends agents to inspect plaintiff's products it might be unfair to
50 Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Il1. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962).
51 See Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76(1962). In interpreting Grobark the court said "that the performance
of jurisdictional acts by a non-resident or his agent, while physically
present in Illinois, is essential for submission to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state ... ." Id. at 480-81, 186 N.E.2d at 79. But when
the plaintiff is the apparent agent of the defendant and the only
physical contact the defendant has with the state, the result may be
different. See Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir.
1957); Bonan v. Leach, 22 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
52 Natural Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1959). But see E Film Corp. v. United Features Syndicate, Inc., 172
F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Il. 1958).
53 Steele v. De Leeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
54 Kaye-Martin v. Brooks, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
55 He would not have purposely availed himself of the laws of that forum.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). And the state's interest in
the subject matter would probably not be strong enough to relax the
application of that rule. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957).
LEGISLATION--JURISDICTION
hold the defendant on the basis of this contact with the forum
because it was the plaintiff who initiated the transactions. 6
Under the present interpretation of the transaction of business
clauses a typical case for jurisdiction can be illustrated by the
decision in Steele v. De Leeuw57 which arose under the New York
long arm statute. There the defendant was a Netherlands cor-
poration. One of its officers traveled to New York and executed
a contract on behalf of the corporation for the purchase of some
stock. The action against the corporation arose out of this con-
tract. In upholding jurisdiction the court cited McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co.58 as the leading case in the area favoring juris-
diction on the basis of a single act, and the court concluded by
saying: "[I]t is clear that the transaction of business test, as set
forth in the new statute, requires considerably less than the con-
tacts required in this state under the doing business test of the
former procedure."59
The language of the De Leeuw case is encouraging because it
takes a positive approach in applying the provisions of the long
arm statute. It does not, however, answer the question posed by
the Grobark analysis of this area, which is whether jurisdiction
can be asserted over a nonresident defendant who has not made a
physical appearance within the forum but has taken the initia-
tive in a transaction concluded by mail. It appears that if you ac-
cept the balancing of interests rationale promoted by International
Shoe and subsequent cases it would be inconsistent to stop the
analysis upon a finding that the defendant had not been physically
present within the forum. This physical presence has not been
required in tortious act cases. An Illinois case, for example, has
allowed jurisdiction where the defendant's only contact with the
state was the foreseeable presence of one of its products within the
state.60 There appears to be no valid reason for distinguishing
between a tort action and a contract action on this issue. Professor
Currie has indicated this in prophesying the eventual demise of
Grobark and other similar cases: "Illinois has a policy of securing
to her businessmen the benefit of their bargains, as well as one of
compensating them for injuries; the former is no less vital to the
health of the Illinois economy than the latter. ' 61
56 See Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
57 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
58 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
59 40 Misc. 2d 807, 808, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
60 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
01 Currie, supra note 30, at 570.
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A federal court in Wisconsin has also disagreed with Grobark
on its analysis of McGee. 2 That case involved a manufacturer's
representative who acted in the nature of an independent con-
tractor in soliciting orders for the defendant, a nonresident cor-
poration. This was the only contact the defendant had with the
forum state. In upholding jurisdiction over the corporation the
court said: "We reject the defendant's contention that the special
interest a state has in providing redress for its residents when an
insurer refuses to pay its claim is the decisive factor in the McGee
case."
6 3
In Paulos v. Best Sec., Inc.,6 4 a Minnesota case, jurisdiction was
upheld over a foreign corporation which had no agents within the
state. The transaction involved resulted from a solicitation by
mail for a subscription to a magazine which analyzed stock market
action. Through information found in this magazine the plaintiff
was led to purchase from the defendant several shares of stock in
an Alaska company. These transactions occurred primarily by
means of long distance telephone calls and some written corres-
pondence. In a suit resulting from these transactions the court
held that the state had a substantial interest in gaining redress
for the plaintiff and that the minimum contacts were sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction. This holding therefore is contra to those re-
quiring the physical presence of defendant's agents within the
state,6 5 but it is arguably distinguishable from them on the basis
that the state has a special regulatory interest in the sale of
securities within its borders.66
The "physical presence" requirement initiated by Grobark
has no place under the International Shoe test. Hanson only re-
quires that the defendant purposely avail himself of the benefits
of the forum. This certainly need not be manifested by the de-
fendant's actual presence in the forum. When this approach is
taken the transaction of business clauses will reach their poten-
tial effectiveness.
B. ToRTIous ACT
The provisions dealing with tortious conduct, under recently
62 Wisconsin Metal & Chem. Corp. v. DeZurick Corp., 222 F. Supp. 119,
123 (D. Wis. 1963).
63 Id. at 123.
64 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
65 See, e.g., Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill. 1959); Grobark
v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959); Saletko v.
Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962).
66 See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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enacted long arm statutes, have been more successful in extending
jurisdiction than have those provisions dealing with the transac-
tion of business. As a result, it has been held that these provisions
are not restricted to torts caused by defendant's actions within the
state, but also extend to situations where defendant's actions oc-
cur entirely outside the state.6 7 Nor is it required that the de-
fendant's activities in the state be continuous. They can be based
upon one isolated contact with the state.6 8 And, while some states
may have 'single act' statutes which require the tort to result in
physical injury to person or property,69 this is not constitu-
tionally required70 and jurisdiction may be extended to torts caus-
ing financial harm to the plaintiff through unfair competition,71
fraud,72 and other torts of a like nature.73
Under a long arm statute it is not difficult to sustain jurisdic-
tion when the injury results from a single act committed within
the state. In Nelson v. Miller,7 4 for example, the defendant had
sent his employee into the state to deliver a stove. The employee,
in negligently unloading the stove, injured the plaintiff. The court
said that defendant's contact with the state was sufficient to up-
hold jurisdiction and that it would not be unfair to require him to
defend in Illinois.
In Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,75 a case cited
67 See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
68 Ibid.
69 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANx. tit. 112, § 21 (Supp. 1963).
70 See Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
There the court said: "I find nothing in the legislative history of the
'single act' statute which supports defendants' claim that the phrase
'tortious act', as set forth in Sec. 302 (a) (2), CPLR, was not intended
to encompass acts of omission. On the contrary, the express provi-
sions of this section clearly include all torts, except those based on
defamation of character. Even this exclusion was not made because
of any constitutional requirements of due process, as alleged by de-
fendants, but was incorporated in the law to avoid unnecessary inhi-
bitions on freedom of speech and of the press .... " Id. at 644, 249
N.Y.S.2d at 6.
71 R.I.T.A. Chem. Corp. v. Malmstrom Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 954
(N.D. fI1. 1962).
72 Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 257 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1958). For a final
disposition of the case and the issue regarding jurisdiction see 287 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1961).
78 See Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
74 11 MI1. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
75 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
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with approval by Justice Black in McGee,70 the Supreme Court of
Vermont allowed jurisdiction where damage was to tangible prop-
erty within the state. In that case defendant corporation sent its
employees into the state to re-roof plaintiff's house. In doing so
they caused considerable damage to the roof. In allowing jurisdic-
tion over the corporation the court said:
Common ideas of justice require that a foreign corporation be
subject to suit in the courts of a state where it does a tortious
act, when the state so elects, and when the suit is based on such
act .... The probabilities are that the witnesses will be readily
available; the law of the state where the act is done will control
the consequences of the act. To require a resident to commence
his action in a foreign jurisdiction on a tort committed where he
lives, and to transport his witnesses to such other state might well
make protection of his right prohibitive and in effect permit a
foreign corporation to commit a tort away from its home with rel-
ative immunity from legal responsibility.77
It is when the defendant's acts are done entirely outside the
state and cause injury to person or property within the state that
jurisdiction may be more difficult to sustain. This type of situa-
tion usually arises when the defendant negligently manufactures a
product which is shipped into the forum state and causes injury
to the plaintiff there. The courts are split in this area on the
amount and nature of the contacts with the forum required to
force the defendant to defend there.78  Some courts require that
there be additional activity in the state other than the mere pres-
ence of the defendant's product therein.7 9 These activities may
include advertisement, solicitation by authorized agents, or other
contacts with the state. Other courts are satisfied with a finding
that the defendant's product caused injury to the plaintiff within
the state.
8 0
76 355 U.S. 220, 223, n.2 (1957).
77 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A.2d 664, 668 (1951).
78 See Currie, supra note 30, at 547.
79 See, e.g., Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.
1959); Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. W. Va. 1962);
Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Moss v.
City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961); Putnam
v. Triangle Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
80 See, e.g., Anderson v. PennCraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill.
1961); McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill.
1961); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607
(1961); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104
N.W.2d 888 (1960); Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251
N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964); Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
of U.S., 43 Misc. 2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Factors such as foreseeability and causation often enter into a
determination of liability to defend in a certain forum.81
They are basically an outgrowth of the rule in Hanson which re-
quires that the defendant purposely avail himself of the benefits
and protections of the forum.
2
If it is reasonably foreseeable, taking into consideration all rele-
vant factors, that defendant's products may find their way into
the forum state he may be said to have purposely submitted to its
jurisdiction.83  If, however, an independent contractor, or some
other intervening force causes the goods to flow into the forum
state it may be difficult to say that the defendant purposely
availed himself of the laws of that state.8 4
The leading case in this area is Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.s5 One of the defendants was a foreign
corporation which manufactured a safety valve in Ohio which was
purchased and attached to a hot water heater by a Pennsylvania
company. The heater was then shipped into Illinois where it ex-
ploded and caused injury to the plaintiff. The corporation which
manufactured the safety valve appeared specially to object to the
court's jurisdiction over its person. With no evidence of any fur-
ther contact with the forum state, the Supreme Court of Illinois
said in upholding jurisdiction that:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manu-
facture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use here,
it should not matter that the purchase was made from an inde-
pendent middleman or that someone other than the defendant
shipped the product into this state.8 6
The court further believed that it was not unreasonable to subject
the defendant to jurisdiction. It is also interesting to note that in
81 See Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases
of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 249 (1959).
82 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
83 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135
N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965).
84 See, e.g., Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445
(1961). That case involved a North Carolina statute which allowed
jurisdiction where the cause of action arose out of the manufacture of
goods which were reasonably expected to be consumed in the forum,
regardless of the fact that an independent contractor may have inter-
vened. This case seemed to fall within the statute because the distri-
butor of the product in the state was like an independent contractor.
But the court denied jurisdiction.
85 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
88 Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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discussing the foreseeability factor the court inferred from the
nature of the defendant's business that a substantial amount of
defendant's goods would be consumed in Illinois. Some courts
will not, however, indulge in such inferences even though they
may be willing to uphold jurisdiction on the basis of one contact
with the forum.8 7
Breach of express warranty actions resulting in injury are
also included within the scope of tortious act clauses. This was
demonstrated in the recent New York decision of Singer v.
Walker.88 In that case the plaintiff, a small boy, was injured by
a geologist's hammer which had been purchased for him from a
New York dealer who had ordered it from defendant's mail order
catalogue. The boy gained possession of the hammer in New York
but sustained injury in Connecticut where it broke while he was
using it. The New York court specifically stated that "a breach of
warranty resulting in harm is now characterized as also a tortious
wrong,"8 9 and further held that "defendant was responsible for a
continuous tortious act, namely, the circulation in New York of a
defective hammer, always bearing its mislabelling. . ... 90
The Singer case will no doubt be a welcome reference for
attorneys in a long arm jurisdiction who feel that they may have a
difficult time proving negligence but can be successful in a breach
of express warranty action. The obvious jurisdictional advantages
to bringing the action under a tortious act clause have been pre-
viously discussed.9 '
Aside from the foregoing considerations it is necessary to cau-
tion the reader on what might be an unexpected contingency to
gaining jurisdiction. This is the possibility that, while the neces-
sary contacts with the forum seem to have been satisfied, it would
still be unfair to require the defendant to defend in that state.
Judge Sobeloff's example in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills9 2
would probably best illustrate this. Assume that while on vaca-
tion a Pennsylvania tourist buys a set of tires from a California
tire dealer. The person making the sale realizes from seeing the
87 See O'Brien v. Comstock Feeds, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
The court here held that a showing that the product was placed within
the stream of commerce, without more, was not sufficient to show that
the defendant had intentionally shipped goods into the state.
88 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
89 Id. at 288, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
90 Id. at 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
91 See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
92 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
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license plates that the buyer is from Pennsylvania. After his re-
turn to Pennsylvania the purchaser of the tires has a blowout
causing him to sustain injury. Subsequently he brings suit in
Pennsylvania. The plaintiff argues that the defendant could fore-
see that he would return to Pennsylvania and use the tires in that
state and should therefore be required to defend there. But the
court would most likely be inclined to hold otherwise unless the
tire company carried on a large volume of interstate activity which
resulted in some other contacts within the state. The reason
would probably be that there is something unfair about requiring
the defendant to go to Pennsylvania when it was the plaintiff
who first traveled to California and there initiated the trans-
action.
C. OWNERSHIP, USE, OR POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE
The ownership, use, or possession of land in the forum pro-
vides an obvious contact with that state. It can hardly be said
that the defendant has not purposely availed himself of the bene-
fits and protections of that jurisdiction when he gains an interest
therein of this nature.
Furthermore, the state has a strong interest in litigation which
may affect title to land located within its borders.9 3 It therefore
appears that the forum state could exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant who had never appeared within the state as long as he
participated in either the buying or selling of land located there9 4
This provision would also allow the owner of an apartment
house to gain jurisdiction over a departed tenant for leaving the
premises in a damaged condition,95 or for the non-payment of rent.
But, in a like manner, a nonresident owner of the premises may
be required to defend an action in that state on the basis of an
injury resulting from negligently failing to keep the premises in
repair,96 or from the breach of a building contract.9 7
A user of the premises is also subjected to jurisdiction pro-
93 See, e.g., RESTATEEN, CONFLICT or LAws § 215 (1934). See also
People v. Streeper, 12 Ill. 2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625 (1957); Note, Owner-
ship, Possession, or Use of Property as a Basis of In Personam Juris-
diction, 44 IowA L. Rsv. 374 (1959).
94 See Currie, supra note 30, at 580.
96 Porter v. Nahas, 35 l. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
96 See Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phil. Co. Ct.
1938). See also, Calcote v. Century Indem. Co., 93 So. 2d 271 (La. Ct.
of Appeals 1957).
97 Wm. E. Strasser Constr. Co. v. Linn, 97 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1957).
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vided the action arises during the time in which he uses the
property,98 and arises out of its use. 9 This may include a con-
tractor in rightful possession of the premises while constructing a
building thereon,100 or even a nonresident mortgagee who has
begun to collect rent upon a default by the mortgagor. 1' 1
Many of the foregoing cases may also appear under another
provision in the statute. Therefore, the main advantage of this
section seems to be in actions affecting title to land when that is
substantially the only connection the defendant has with the
forum.
D. CONTRACTING TO INSURE ANY PERSON, PROPERTY OR RISK
Little need be said about this section since it is based upon the
philosophy of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. which has al-
ready been discussed. 0 2 From this decision it is apparent that
the only required contact with the forum is the insurance con-
tract. This contract does not however, have to be made within
the forum, nor are agents required to be present in the forum in
order to sustain jurisdiction.
It should further be noted that the Illinois statute limits juris-
diction to actions arising from any person, property or risk insured
which is "located within this State at the time of contracting." 0 3
This guarantees a substantial interest on the part of the state in
the subject matter of the litigation, which may be constitutionally
required when the minimum contacts are otherwise lacking. The
Wisconsin statute is not so limited. 04
V. NEBRASKA LAW AND EXTENDED JURISDICTION
In Nebraska, jurisdiction can be obtained over nonresident
corporations if they are doing business within the state.10 5 An
isolated transaction is not considered doing business'0 6 unless it
reveals a purpose or intention to carry on further activities within
98 Murphy v. Indovina, 384 Pa. 26, 119 A.2d 258 (1956).
99 Shouse v. Wagner, 84 Pa. D. & C. 82 (Aleg. Co. Ct. 1952).
100 Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D. & C. 557 (Phil. Co. Ct. 1954).
101 Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phil. Co. Ct. 1938).
102 See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(1)d (1963).
104 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1963).
105 See NFB. REv. STAT. § 21-20,114 (Cum. Supp. 1963). This statute has
supplanted NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1211 (Reissue 1962).
106 Pitzer v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 143 Neb. 394, 9 N.W.2d 495 (1943).
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the state.10 7 Under the old Nebraska doing business statute, juris-
diction could not be asserted over those engaged solely in inter-
state commerce. 0 8 This rule may be changed, however, by the
new Business Corporation Act which became effective in 1963.109
It does not specifically exclude corporations engaged solely in inter-
state activity,"0 and there is no apparent reason why it should.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has said that corporations
operating interstate can be amenable to state court jurisdiction."1
However, the old doing business test is still a part of the statute
and will no doubt be interpreted in light of the decisions inter-
preting that phrase under the prior statute."2
Foreign insurers are subject to jurisdiction in Nebraska un-
der a separate statute."3  The legislature provided specially for
substituted service on unauthorized insurers." 4  The purpose of
this section is to prevent those who have contracts with foreign
insurers from having to resort to distant forums." 5 The applicable
section apparently applies, however, only when the activities
within the state are "systematic or continuous.""16
Another Nebraska statute bases jurisdiction over nonresidents
on one contact with the state, and is also applicable to individuals.
This is the nonresident motorist statute which is used to serve
process on nonresidents who have had a motor vehicle accident
within the state and since left its borders." 7 This statute is
strictly construed and applies only to those parties specifically
mentioned." 8
107 Tomson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 88 Neb. 399, 129 N.W.
529, rev'd on other grounds 89 Neb. 791, 132 N.W. 405 (1911).
108 Traphagen v. Lindsay, 95 Neb. 823, 146 N.W. 1026 (1914); Nebraska
Wheat Growers Ass'n v. Norquest, 113 Neb. 731, 204 N.W. 798 (1925).
109 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,114 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
110 Ibid.
111 See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914).
112 See note 122, infra.
113 NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-137 (Reissue 1960). Nonresidents dealing in se-
curities are also covered by a special statute. See Neb. Laws 1965, ch.
549, at 1790.
1"4 NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-137.03 (Supp. 1963).
115 NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-137.02 (Supp. 1963).
116 Ibid.
117 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-530 (Reissue 1964).
118 Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N.W. 333 (1941). It has been held,
however, that a nonresident corporation can also be subjected to juris-
diction under this statute if one of its employees has an accident while
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If Nebraska does not follow the present trend, and enact a
long arm statute, it may still liberalize the interpretation of its
doing business statute. 119 Some states, namely California, have
chosen this course. 120 Justice Traynor, in later reflections upon
his participation in those California decisions, reasoned that the
doing business statutes were originally geared to due process and,
consequently, were flexible in meaning.121  Some commentators,
nevertheless, seem to agree that the "doing business" language in
these statutes cannot logically be extended to reach the limits of
due process, and a majority of the cases seem to support their
speculations.122  Furthermore, a statute like Nebraska's, even
though interpreted liberally, could not reach a nonresident in-
dividual without contradicting the express desire of the legislature
to limit the language to corporations. 123 As a result, many of the
advantages bestowed upon the states by the International Shoe
rationale are unavailable to Nebraska plaintiffs.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not clarified its position
with regard to the new due process rationale. In a recent case,
for example, the court gave passing recognition to International
Shoe but based its decision upon language that was familiar long
before that case appeared. 124 Even the result supplied no indica-
in the course of his business. Covert v. Hastings Mfg. Co., 44 F. Supp.
773 (D. Neb. 1942).
119 See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 909, 1000 (1960). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-321 (Reissue
1964) which has been restrictively construed to prevent its use as a
long arm statute. See Coffman, Service of Summons in Nebraska, 15
NEB. L. BULL. 333, 359 (1937).
120 See, e.g., Borgward v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72, 325 P.2d 137
(1958); Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855,
323 P.2d 437 (1958).
121 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAS L. REV. 657
(1959).
122 See Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA
L. REV. 345 (1959).
123 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,114 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
124 Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copymation, Inc., 178 Neb. 239, 244, 132 N.W.
2d 788, 791 (1965). The court said: "It does seem, as a minimal re-
quirement, that the manner and extent of doing business in this state
must be such as to warrant the inference of actual as distinguished
from a merely fictitious or constructive presence in the state, and such
that it may be said that the corporation itself, through the representa-
tive capacity of its agents, is in the state. To hold that a foreign cor-
poration is doing business in Nebraska merely because it fills an order
received by mail from a Nebraska resident without more appearing,
is to extend the doctrine of doing business in the state for the purpose
of contructive service too far." See also Berg v. Midwest Laundry
Equip. Corp., 175 Neb. 423, 122 N.W.2d 250 (1963).
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tion of the court's true position because the case appeared to be
a close one even under a long arm statute, and was therefore
clearly not within the doing business statute.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that Nebraska should adopt a long arm statute.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have greatly
expanded the concepts upon which Nebraska's present statutes are
based. Other states have reacted by enacting long arm statutes
which have already proven their effectiveness, leaving no doubt
that the old "doing business" statutes are becoming rapidly out-
dated.
It is the responsibility of the Nebraska legislature to keep
abreast with modern legislation that may be beneficial to the wel-
fare of the state's citizens. The long arm statute is a streamlined
example of this type of legislation. Modern methods of transpor-
tation and communication have made commercial transactions on a
nation-wide scale common-place. Potentially dangerous products
may be manufactured hundreds of miles away causing eventual
injury to a buyer in this state. Consequently, resident business-
men and buyers are increasingly coming into contact with non-
residents. Inevitably some form of injury results and a cause of
action must be prosecuted. If the defendant is a corporation and
is not doing business in Nebraska the claimant must spend hundreds
of dollars to travel to the defendant's home forum. And if the
defendant is unincorporated Nebraska courts can acquire juris-
diction over him only if he is present within this state.
If Nebraska passed a long arm statute many of these problems
would be eliminated, and the citizens of this state would be finan-
cially benefited. Nebraska courts would be conveniently open to
them, when now the problem of jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants is difficult if not financially unfeasible.
When the United States Supreme Court has supplied the legal
motive, Illinois and other states the method, it would appear that
the legislature should follow these precedents if the benefits to
the state outweigh the burdens. These burdens should appear
insignificant when matched with the need of many Nebraska
plaintiffs for an inexpensive and convenient redress against an
elusive but culpable nonresident defendant. It is hoped that this
article will provide an incentive and a source of information for
action in this area.
Lyman L. Larsen '66
